26march1971operation searchligtht in dhaka.

26march1971operation searchligtht in dhaka.

After the awami league had
won a decisive majority (capturing 167 out of 313 seats) in the 1970 Pakistan parliamentary elections, the Bengali
population expected a swift transfer of power to the Awami League based on the Six Point Programme. On February 28,
1971, Yahya Khan, the President of Pakistan, under the pressure of
PPP of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, postponed the national
assembly meeting

scheduled for March. The Pakistan Peoples Party had already started
lobbying to weaken the stand of 

Sheikh Mujib, and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was heard saying
that he wanted the Bengalis to stay away. The Awami League, in response to the
postponement, launched a program of non-cooperation (largely outlined in the
March 7th Awami League rally) which was so successful that the authority of the
Pakistan government became limited to the cantonments and government
institutions in East Pakistan.Clashes between
civilians and the Pakistani Army, and between Bengali
and Bihari communities erupted
and became commonplace. President Yahya Khan flew to Dhaka to hold talks
with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, leader of the Awami
League, in March, and was later joined by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, then the leader of
Pakistan Peoples Party, which had secured the second largest share of seats (81
out of 300) in the elections.Unwilling to
transfer power to East Pakistan as demanded by Awami League (fearing a transfer
of power would weaken or destroy the federation), or to lose face by backing
down in face of the non-cooperation movement, the Pakistani generals, most of
which including Gul Hassan Khan supported the Pakistan Peoples Party, finally decided on a
military crackdown.

After the convening of
the National Assembly was postponed by Yahya Khan on March 1, ethnic Biharis in
East Pakistan, who supported West Pakistan, were targeted.In early March 1971
300 Biharis were killed in rioting by mobs in Chittagong. The Government of
Pakistan used the 'Bihari massacre' to justify its military intervention in
East Pakistan on March 25,when it initiated
Operation Searchlight.

Prior to the launch of
the operation, a final meeting was held in General Headquarters (GHQ). Martial
Law Administrator of East Pakistan and unified Commander of Pakistan's Eastern Military High
Command Vice-Admiral Syed Mohammad Ahsan objected to the
planned operation. Air Commodore Mitty
Masud also
objected to the operation, fearing that violence would provoke East-Pakistan
into more violence. However, under pressure during the meeting from Pakistan's
Army and Air Force's general, General Yahya Khan gave orders to his Army and
Air Force commanders to launch the operation.Disheartened and
isolated, Admiral Ahsan resigned, in protest, from his position as Martial Law
Administrator, unified commander of Eastern Military High Command, and the
navy. With operation came
in effect, Air-Commodore Mitty Masud too resigned from the Air Force and as
Commander of Eastern Air Force Command (EAFC).

The operational plan

The
planning process

The plan was drawn up in
March 1971 by Major General Khadim Hussain Raja, GOC 14th Division, and
Major General Rao Farman Ali, as a followup of
decisions taken at a meeting of the Pakistani army staff on 22
February.The 16th infantry
division from Quetta and the 9th
division from Kharian, West
Pakistan, were ordered to prepare to move to East Pakistan in
mid-February also as a result of that meeting.

Before putting the plan
into action, senior Pakistani officers in East Pakistan who were unwilling to
support the military attack on civilians, Lt. General Shahabzada Yakub Khan,
GOC East Pakistan, and the governor of East Pakistan,
Vice Admiral Syed Mohammad Ahsan, were relieved of their
duties. Lt. Gen. Tikka Khan became the Governor
and GOC of East Pakistan. On March 17, General Raja was given authority to plan
the operation via telephone by General Hamid, COS, Pakistan Army. On the
morning of March 18, General Raja and Major General Rao Farman Ali wrote the
plan at the GOC's office at Dacca (Dhaka) cantonment. The plan was written on a
"Light Blue Office Pad with a Lead Pencil" by General Farman
containing "16 Paragraphs Spread Over Five Pages".

General Farman defined
the operational premises and conditions for success, while General Khadim Raja
dealt with the distribution of forces and tasks assigned to the individual
brigades and other units. It assumed that the Bengali Army and other military
units would revolt at the onset of operations and the planners
suggested that all Bengali units under arms should be disarmed prior to
commencing the operation, and the political leadership arrested during a
planned meeting with the President, General Yahya Khan. No operational reserves
were earmarked. The handwritten plan was reviewed with General Hamid and Lt.
General Tikka Khan on 20 March at the flag staff house. General Hamid objected
to the immediate disarming of regular army Bengali units, but approved the
disarming of the EPR, armed police and other para-military formations. Yahya
Khan refused to sanction the arrest of Awami League leaders during a meeting
with him, as the plan had proposed.The amended plan
was approved and distributed to various area commanders.

The Operation was to
start on the night of March 25, 1971 in Dacca, and other garrisons were to be
alerted via phone about their zero hour to start their activities. General
Farman Ali commanded the forces in Dhaka, while the rest of the province was
commanded by General Khadim. Lt. General Tikka Khan and his staff were present
in the 31st field command center, to supervise and support the command staff of
the 14th division. The initial plan to arrest by a company of No 3 SSG, led by
major ZA Khan was scheduled at 0100 on 26 March night.